IDENTITY & ACCESS / INTERACTIVE SPECIFICATION

A shared history.
A considered approach
to access.

Explore how a self-hosted identity provider and a backend session
keep responsibilities clear.

STATIC DEMONSTRATION · No identity service is connected.
Sample locations below are public fixtures, not protected data.

UNDERSTAND THE BOUNDARIES

Try a role. See the difference.

NO DEMO SESSION

Changing this selector is a local teaching tool.
Real role assignment belongs to Keycloak admins.

Location archive
⌑

Sign-in is required.

The actual directory and API have no anonymous mode.

LEAST PRIVILEGE, EXPLICIT GRANTS

Three roles. Clear responsibilities.

CapabilityViewerEditorAdmin
List & read locations✓✓✓
Create, update & delete locations—✓✓
Manage accounts & role grants——Keycloak console

Identity belongs to Keycloak.

Accounts, password changes, role assignments, temporary-password resets and disable/delete actions stay in the provider. No application user-administration endpoints are defined.

Session belongs to the backend.

OIDC authorization code + PKCE. Tokens stay in a server-side in-memory session; the browser receives an HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Lax cookie. Thirty minutes idle expiry; restart logs everyone out.

Public means separate.

Only login entry/callback endpoints are public in the application policy. A read-only public map and bearer-token MCP access are distinct post-MVP components.

Source policy question: role-less social users

The general policy says every authenticated user is implicitly a viewer. The later social-login section says a new provider user without roles cannot act until a grant. These statements require reconciliation. This demo shows the stricter pending-role social case separately and does not claim that ambiguity is resolved.

FOLLOW A SESSION

The browser never holds a token.

→→→→

Provider, not automatic linking.

Google is brokered through Keycloak in the source stage environment. An existing email match is denied until the user signs in and explicitly links the provider. Apple is not selected.

Operational exposure stays narrow.

The ingress routes the avarc realm and resources under /auth. Admin, master realm and management port 9000 stay off public ingress. JSON logs exclude login-code query strings; events are held for 30 days.

Recovery preserves identity.

Database backup is primary. User exports preserve IDs, provider links and explicit roles; local passwords need reset after API-only restore. No backup or personal record is accessed in this demo.